Do the effects of R&D tax credits vary across industries? A meta-regression analysis by Castellacci, Fulvio & Lie, Christine
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Do the effects of R&D tax credits vary
across industries? A meta-regression
analysis
Fulvio Castellacci and Christine Lie
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, TIK Centre, University
of Oslo
July 2013
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47937/
MPRA Paper No. 47937, posted 2 July 2013 13:54 UTC
1 
 
 
Do the effects of R&D tax credits vary across 
industries? A meta-regression analysis 
 
 
 
 
Fulvio Castellacci and Christine Mee Lie 
 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) & TIK Centre, University of Oslo 
 
 
 
 
This draft: 1 July 2013 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper presents a survey of the micro-econometric literature on the effects of R&D tax 
credits on firms’ innovation activities. We focus on one specific aspect that has not received 
sufficient attention in previous research: the sectoral dimension. Our meta-regression analysis 
(MRA) sets up a new database collecting a large number of firm-level studies on the effects of 
R&D tax credits and investigates the factors that may explain differences in the estimated effects 
that are reported in the literature. The main result of the MRA analysis is indeed that sectors matter. 
Micro-econometric studies that have focused on a sub-sample of high-tech industries have on 
average obtained a smaller estimated effect of R&D tax credits. The paper proposes a simple 
framework to investigate why the effects of R&D tax credits vary across sectors and points out 
new directions and hypotheses for future research.  
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1. Introduction  
R&D tax credits are a major public policy instrument that has the objective to increase private 
firms’ incentives to invest in innovative activities. They are tax deductions that business 
enterprises can claim if they are involved in R&D activities, which have the effect of reducing the 
marginal costs of R&D investments faced by firms (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000). 
A large empirical literature has investigated the effects of fiscal incentives to R&D, in the attempt 
to estimate the extent to which a given amount of tax credits leads to an increase in firms’ R&D 
investments. While the earlier literature focused on a few countries only, and in particular the US, 
an increasing number of micro-econometric studies on a large number of economies have been 
presented during the last few years (Parsons and Phillips, 2007; Mohnen and Lokshin, 2009). The 
exponential growth in the literature is partly due to the increasing popularity of tax credits, which 
are now adopted in more than 20 OECD countries; but it has also been fostered by the greater 
availability and diffusion of firm-level data in several countries, and particularly in Europe (Bodas 
Freitas and von Tunzelmann, 2008; OECD, 2010). 
The bulk of this micro-econometric literature provides estimates of the rate at which R&D 
investments increase due to the introduction of fiscal incentives (additionality ratio) or, 
correspondingly, the rate at which the marginal costs of R&D investments decrease (user-cost 
elasticity). One dominant characteristic common to most of the existing studies is that their main 
objective is to estimate the average effect of R&D tax credits in a large sample of firms. So far, 
however, the literature has not questioned explicitly whether this average estimated parameter 
may vary among industrial sectors, and the possible reasons for cross-industry differences. 
One of the major results in the field of innovation studies is that sectors matter. Firms in different 
industries differ substantially in terms of the innovation strategy they adopt and the technological 
performance they achieve. The sectoral context provides micro agents (firms) with a set of 
opportunities and constraints that greatly shape the way in which they organize their innovative 
activities (Pavitt, 1984; Malerba, 2005). Specifically, the R&D distribution of firms varies greatly 
by sectors. Other sector-specific factors – such as the degree of market competition, 
technological opportunities, and the intensity of knowledge diffusion and spillover effects – do 
also differ substantially across industries. It is therefore reasonable to suspect that firms’ 
responsiveness to fiscal incentives to R&D, and the related innovation and productivity effects, 
may vary considerably among industries. 
So, do the effects of R&D policy support vary systematically by sector, and if so, why? Our paper 
intends to investigate this new research question by carrying out an updated overview of the 
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literature and a meta-regression analysis to study whether the effects of tax credits differ across 
industries.   
Our meta-regression analysis (MRA) builds up a new database containing information on a large 
number of recent firm-level studies on the effects of R&D tax credits. We then investigate the 
factors that may explain differences in the estimated effects that are reported in the literature. In 
addition to several other control factors, the key explanatory variable that we focus on refers 
precisely to the sectoral dimension: our MRA regressions investigate whether those studies that 
have controlled for sectoral characteristics, e.g. by comparing high- and low-tech industries, have 
on average achieved different results than all other micro-econometric works. The main result of 
the MRA analysis is surprising: empirical studies that have focused on a sub-sample of high-tech 
industries have on average obtained a smaller estimated effect of R&D tax credits.  
This is an interesting pattern that calls for further research. If corroborated by future 
investigations, this finding would cast some important doubts on the effectiveness of R&D tax 
incentives. This would in fact imply that fiscal resources intended to stimulate R&D and 
economic competitiveness have a relatively stronger effect on those industrial sectors that are 
characterized by low technological opportunities, sluggish demand conditions and weak spillover 
effects to the rest of the economy. If so, R&D tax incentives mechanisms should be redesigned 
in order to take into account the sector-specific conditions that shape innovation propensity and 
dynamics in different industries of the economy, and in particular allocate a greater amount of 
fiscal incentives to R&D to high-opportunity and technologically dynamic sectors. 
There exists a few other thorough overviews of this literature, and in particular Hall and Van 
Reenen (2000), Parsons and Phillips (2007), Mohnen and Lokshin (2009) and Cerulli (2012). The 
specific novelty of our survey paper and its intended contribution to the literature are twofold. 
First, the adoption of the MRA database and methodology opens up for future updates and 
extensions of this type of analysis of the effects of R&D policy. Secondly, by explicitly 
investigating the role of the sectoral dimension, we create a bridge between the R&D policy 
literature, on the one hand, and the important strand of research on sectoral patterns of 
innovation, on the other. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the literature on the effects of R&D tax 
incentives. Section 3 presents the MRA database, indicators and econometric methods. Section 4 
summarizes the MRA regression results. Section 5 discusses a framework for future research. 
Section 6 concludes and outlines the implications of the work. 
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2. The effects of R&D tax credits 
Business firms’ R&D investments are important for the growth and competitiveness of national 
economies. Several countries have recently increased their efforts to strengthen innovation 
performance by means of R&D policy, following e.g. the guidelines of the Lisbon Agenda in EU 
(Lundvall and Borràs, 2005). R&D policy can basically take two distinct forms: it can either 
allocate directly public R&D resources through grants or procurement, or alternatively provide 
indirect support by means of R&D tax incentives.  
R&D tax incentives are tax deductions that firms can claim if they are involved in R&D activities, 
thus providing them with an incentive to increase their innovation efforts. Tax credits are 
typically directed to all firms in the economy and hence let private agents decide what type of 
project to apply for. Their effect is to reduce the marginal cost of R&D investments (Hall and 
Van Reenen, 2000). By contrast, R&D subsidies target specific projects with high social returns 
and a longer time horizon, and their effect is to raise the marginal rate of return of R&D (David 
et al., 2000; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013). An advantage of tax incentives vis-a-vis subsidies 
is that the former are less subject to policy inefficiencies, since they are bottom up and based on 
agents’ decisions, whereas subsidies are more likely to incur in policy failure because they are 
highly dependent on the information available to the policy makers that manage the R&D 
programme and the strategic priorities set by this.  
R&D tax incentives have by now become a popular innovation policy instrument. More than 20 
OECD countries currently support private R&D investments through this type of schemes, 
including not only advanced countries but also developing economies such as Brazil, India, China 
and South Africa (OECD, 2010). The widespread adoption of this type of R&D support schemes 
has increasingly attracted the attention of innovation scholars and fostered the development of a 
large stream of applied research, which investigates the effects of tax credits on firms’ R&D 
expenditures by making use of firm-level data. While most of the early studies focused on 
enterprises in US States, the literature has recently been fostered by the increasing availability of 
firm-level datasets in several other countries and particularly in Europe.  
Hall and Van Reenen (2000) present a seminal overview of methods and results in this field. 
Parsons and Phillips (2007) provide an updated survey of the main results in the literature, and 
Cerulli and Poti (2012) is a comprehensive discussion of econometric methods in R&D policy 
evaluation. Researchers interested in the effects of R&D tax incentives on firms’ innovation have 
typically adopted two distinct microeconometric approaches. The first is to estimate the 
following equation: 
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RDij = η + βTCij + θXij + μij                                                                                                     (1) 
 
where RDij is the R&D expenditures of firm i in industry j, TCij is a variable measuring the tax 
credit received by the enterprise, and Xij is a vector of firm-specific characteristics affecting its 
R&D strategies (e.g. past R&D, cash flow and financial conditions, size, technological 
capabilities). In this specification, the parameter β (expected positive) measures the additionality 
ratio, which indicates the average increase that a tax credit induces in firms’ R&D investments.1 
The second approach estimates instead the following equation:  
 
RDij = κ + λUCij + ψXij + νij                                                                                                     (2) 
 
in which UCij is a variable measuring the user cost of R&D (i.e. its marginal costs), and the 
parameter λ (expected negative) is the elasticity of R&D with respect to its price, measuring by 
how much R&D will increase when its marginal costs decrease.2 
The bulk of the R&D policy evaluation literature has so far focused on the estimation of the 
average additionality ratio (in equation 1) or the average price elasticity (in equation 2) in each 
national economy. However, the field has so far neglected the study of the existence and extent 
of cross-industry differences in these estimated parameters. This is an important research gap and 
avenue for future research. 
One of the major results that has convincingly been shown within the field of innovation studies 
is that sectors matter. Firms in different industries differ substantially in terms of the innovation 
strategy they adopt and the technological performance they achieve. The sectoral context 
provides micro agents (firms) with a set of opportunities and constraints that greatly shape the 
way in which they organize their innovative activities (Pavitt, 1984; Malerba, 2005). The R&D 
distribution of firms varies greatly by sectors. R&D intensive firms are typically concentrated in 
technologically advanced industries, whereas enterprises in more traditional sectors do not make 
use of R&D activities as their dominant strategy to create or implement new technologies. But 
the innovation literature has also shown that sectors differ along several other dimensions, such 
as the degree of market competition, technological opportunities, and the intensity of knowledge 
diffusion and spillover effects. 
                                                             
1 The additionality ratio is either pointed out as treatment effect, if matching or difference-in-difference estimators are 
used, or simply as incrementality ratio through OLS and IV estimators. 
 
2 Hall and Van Reenen (2000: 467) define the user cost of R&D as the “pre-tax real rate of return on the marginal 
investment project that is required to earn a minimum rate of return after tax”. 
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Therefore, it is reasonable to ask whether the effects of R&D policy support vary systematically 
by sector, and if so, why. Our paper intends to investigate this unexplored issue by carrying out 
an updated overview and a meta-regression analysis of the literature.   
 
 
3. MRA: data and methods  
 
3.1 Data and indicators 
Following the standard MRA methodology (see e.g. Stanley, 2001), the search process for 
relevant papers to include in the meta-analysis database included: Google- and Google Scholar 
searches; the EconLit database; the JSTOR-, Ideas- and Science Direct Journal databases; all 
relevant journals in the innovation field; working paper series; homepages of relevant academics  
in the field; tables and reference lists in previously published survey papers. Key words used in 
this literature search were “R&D tax credits”, “R&D tax incentives”, “effects of R&D tax 
credits”, and “effects of R&D tax incentives”.  
Only papers that presented an econometric analysis of the effects of R&D tax credits on firm-
level innovation, and that provided enough information regarding the effect estimates and their 
standard errors (or t-statistics), were further considered.3 Our literature search focused more 
carefully on those more recent micro-econometric studies produced from 2000 onwards. Earlier 
studies had been identified and surveyed in previous overview papers, which made some of our 
data collection tasks easier.4 
Typically, each study on the effects of R&D fiscal incentives present estimation results for several 
regressions. There is no clear benchmark or rule in the meta-regression literature for deciding 
how many and which of these reported regressions should be included in a MRA dataset. In 
order to have as many observations as possible and thus increase the variability of our sample, 
the selection criterion we used was somewhat broad. We included all different regressions 
produced by the same micro-econometric study as different observations in our dataset, as long 
as these regressions differed between them in some substantial way, e.g. in terms of their sub-
sample, time period, model specification, tax-credit measure or dependent variable. This 
procedure is in line with other recent meta-analysis exercises in other fields of economic research 
(e.g. Doucouliagos and Stanley 2009; Efendic et al. 2012).  
                                                             
3 Notice also that we have only focused on papers that study “first-order effects” of fiscal incentives (i.e. their direct 
effects on R&D investments), and disregard the few studies investigating their effects on other firm-level variables 
(e.g. innovation output and economic performance). 
 
4 Hall and Van Reenen (2000), Parsons and Phillips (2007), Mohnen and Lokshin (2009), Hall et al. (2009) and Yang 
(2011) were the survey papers of direct relevance that we found and that we used during the search process. 
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This data collection procedure left us with a total of 31 articles, published between 1991 and 
2012, and a total of 393 effect estimates. Tables 1 and 2 provide a complete list of references and 
some of the key characteristics of these 31 articles. Table 1 lists all the papers we found in which 
the dependent variable is the additionality ratio, estimated by using the model specification 
pointed out in equation 1 (see section 2). Table 2 lists instead all the articles in our database in 
which the dependent variable is the user cost elasticity, estimated through equation 2. As 
explained in section 2, equations 1 and 2 represent two different econometric approaches to 
estimate the effects of R&D tax incentives, and we will therefore consider them separately in our 
MRA analysis. The MRA database we have produced is available online, in order to ensure 
replicability and further extensions of this work in future research.5 
 
< Tables 1 and 2 here > 
 
Table 3 provides a list of the indicators we constructed on the MRA database and included in the 
analysis, along with their definition and descriptive statistics. Two of the indicators measure 
industry-specific characteristics (when these are considered in the micro-econometric studies): 
HTECH (dummy for high-tech subsamples) and MANUF (dummy for manufacturing 
subsamples). These variables test whether the effects of R&D tax credits are higher or lower 
when they are estimated on different sectoral subsamples. The SME variable (dummy for SMEs 
subsamples) controls whether small and medium-sized companies have different estimated 
effects than the overall sample of firms used in each study. We also include three further control 
variables: RDt-1 (dummy for the inclusion of lagged R&D as control variable in each study), 
SUBSIDY (dummy for the inclusion of R&D subsidies as control variable) and COUNTRY 
(dummy for the inclusion of country fixed effects). Several more characteristics of each paper and 
each regression were collected in the meta-database, and are available online for future extensions 
of this MRA study. 
 
< Table 3 here > 
 
3.2 Econometric methods 
The baseline specification of the meta-regression model regresses the effects size of interest (i.e. 
the estimated additionality ratio, or user-cost elasticity) on an intercept and a measure of statistical 
precision, typically the standard error (SE): 
                                                             
5 The database is available at: http://english.nupi.no/Activities/Projects/R-D-Policy-by-Sector-A-Cross-Country-
Investigation 
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                     ̂    ̂            ̂                                                                                       
 
where s = 1,…, 31 indexes the studies in the meta-database, and i = 1,…, 393 the individual 
regression estimates reported.  ̂,  ̂  are estimated, and   ̂   is the error term. To avoid 
heteroskedasticity, the common practice is to weight equation 3 by the standard error (SE) 
associated with each observation (Stanley et al. 2008). Equation 4, which is the weighted least 
squares (WLS) of equation (1), thus yields more efficient estimates: 
 
           ̂  (
 
     
)   ̂     ̂   (
 
     
)                                                                                   
 
After this transformation, the dependent variable is now the t-statistic (        ) of the effect 
estimate in equation 3.6 However, the estimated parameters in equation 4 must still be interpreted 
in terms of changes in the size of the effect estimate, not in terms of changes in statistical 
significance (changes in t-statistics) (Efentic et al. 2011). Note also that the intercept and the 
precision coefficient are reversed in equation (4), and so the main variable of interest is now the 
inverse of the standard error (
 
     
).  
Egger et al. (1997) point out that the t-test of the intercept in equation 4 is a test for publication 
bias, which indicates whether some omitted variables in equation 4 (e.g. characteristics of the 
studies or the researchers that have produced them) may lead to a systematic selection effect and 
hence a bias in the estimated effect. Stanley (2008) argues that the meta-regression model can be 
used to test not only for publication selection, but also for estimating the true empirical effect after 
having controlled for publication bias. The first test is referred to as the funnel asymmetry test (FAT) 
and the latter as the precision-effect test (PET). More formally, FAT tests the hypothesis      ̂   , 
where non-rejection implies lack of publication selection and rejection is consistent with either 
upward (positive sign) or downward publication bias (negative sign). As for the PET, the 
hypothesis      ̂    is tested, where rejection is consistent with the existence of an authentic 
empirical effect, and could be interpreted as the true effect corrected for any publication bias 
(Stanley, 2008).  
                                                             
6 The t-statistics, if not explicitly reported in the original paper, is calculated by using the formula:   
          
                 
     
 , and equivalently to find the SE (if not reported):        
                 
        
 , see e.g. 
Fischer (1954). 
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In this paper, in addition to these two standard terms, we are interested to investigate the extent 
to which different characteristics of the micro-econometric studies of R&D policy (see the 
indicators in table 3) explain the different estimated effects that are reported in the literature. In 
particular, we want to focus on the sectoral dimension, and investigate whether running the 
micro-econometric regressions on different sectoral sub-samples has a systematic influence on 
the estimated effect of R&D tax credits. We therefore extend the baseline specification in 
equation (4) to include a set of additional explanatory variables. Our multivariate meta-regression 
(MRA) model in equation 5 includes a set of k moderator (control) variables: 
 
           ̂  (
 
     
)   ̂  ∑ ̂ 
 
 
  (
 
     
)            ̂    (
 
     
)                                
 
where        are the k = 1,…, K moderator variables each weighted by  (
 
     
), and  ̂  are the k 
coefficients to be estimated in the meta-regression. Each of these coefficients measures the 
impact of the corresponding moderator on the true empirical effect size.  
 
 
4. MRA results  
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the meta-regression analysis (MRA). Table 4 reports the 
results for the estimation of equation 5, referring to the empirical approach in which the 
dependent variable used in previous empirical studies is the additionality ratio (see equation 1, 
section 2). Table 5 does instead report the estimation results referring to the second model 
specification that is typically adopted in the literature, which has as dependent variable the user 
cost elasticity (see equation 2, section 2).  
In each of these tables, we progressively include the various explanatory variables, going from the 
baseline to the complete version of the model. Specification 1 only includes the constant (the 
publication bias effect) and the INVSE variable (measure of the true empirical effect of R&D tax 
incentives). Specification 2 includes the two variables measuring industry-specific characteristics: 
HTECH (dummy for high-tech subsamples), the variable of our main interest, and the control 
variable MANUF (dummy for manufacturing subsamples). Specification 3 adds the SME variable 
(dummy for SMEs subsamples). Specification 4 also includes three further control variables: RD t-
1 (dummy for the inclusion of lagged R&D as control variable in the study), SUBSIDY (dummy 
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for the inclusion of R&D subsidies as a control variable) and COUNTRY (dummy for the 
inclusion of country fixed effects).  
In both of the tables, the R-squared indicates that the meta-regressions have a relatively good 
explanatory power, so that the model takes into account some of the most important 
characteristics that explain variation in the estimated effects of R&D tax credits among different  
micro-econometric studies available in the literature. Note that the signs of all estimated 
coefficients in table 4 are just the opposite as those in table 5, for the obvious reason that the 
former table has a positive measure as dependent variable (additionality ratio), whereas the latter 
makes use of a negative one (user cost elasticity). 
In both tables 4 and 5, the estimated parameter for the constant is significant, providing evidence 
of a publication (selection) bias effect. The parameter is positive in table 4 and negative in table 5, 
indicating that previous studies overestimated the effect of R&D tax credits on firms’ innovation 
activities when they failed to control for a set of ancillary factors that may affect this relationship 
(and that our MRA regressions try to correct for). However, in spite of this publication bias, 
there is also significant evidence of a true empirical effect (measured by the variable INVSE), 
which is obviously positive for the additionality ratio (table 4) and negative for the user cost 
elasticity (table 5). 
Before looking at the results of the estimations for the variable of main interest for this study, 
HTECH, let us briefly discuss the results for the set of control variables we have included in our 
MRA model in tables 4 and 5. The variable MANUF is statistically significant in both tables. Its 
estimated coefficient (positive in table 4 and negative in table 5) indicates that those studies that 
have run regressions on a sub-sample of manufacturing companies (i.e. excluding service firms) 
have on average obtained a greater estimated effect of fiscal incentives to R&D. This result is not 
surprising, since the innovation literature has often pointed out that the bulk of R&D activities is 
concentrated in manufacturing industries, whereas enterprises in the service sectors innovate 
through a variety of different strategies among which R&D is certainly not the dominant mode 
(Castellacci, 2008). It is therefore reasonable to infer that service firms are less responsive to 
R&D policy schemes than manufacturing companies. Next, the variable SME tests whether the 
effects of R&D tax credits differ when they are estimated for sub-samples of SMEs. The variable 
is weakly significant in the full model specification in regressions 4. When estimated with 
precision, the coefficient indicates that the additionality ratio (user cost elasticity) is smaller 
(larger) for SMEs than for the whole sample of firms. 
The next three variables are control factors that micro-econometric studies in this field should in 
principle include in the econometric specification but sometimes do not (e.g. due to the lack of 
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available data). When the lagged R&D variable (RDt-1) is included in the specification to alleviate 
endogeneity issues, the estimated effect of R&D policy is obviously smaller in size. The same 
effect arises when the control variable SUBSIDY is included in the regression. This is a measure 
of R&D subsidies received by the firm in addition to the R&D tax credits, so it is reasonable that 
when this is controlled for the estimated additionality ratio turns out to be lower. Finally, the 
control variable COUNTRY tests for the inclusion of country fixed effects in the regressions, 
which are only used by the few studies having availability of firm-level data for more than one 
country, or States within a country (typically the US). This variable is only significant in table 4. 
Its estimated sign indicates that the additionality effect is higher for those works including 
country-fixed effects, and this result is arguably driven by firm-level estimates obtained on US 
datasets, where fiscal incentives to R&D have a longer tradition and more established effects than 
in other OECD countries.  
Let us now shift the focus to the results for the variable of main interest for our paper: HTECH, 
the dummy variable indicating whether each micro-econometric regression reported in the 
literature focuses on a sub-sample of high-tech industries (dummy = 1), or rather considers the 
whole sample available without any further control for sector-specific differences (dummy = 0). 
This variable turns out to be statistically significant. Its estimated coefficient is negative in table 4 
and positive in table 5. This means that micro-econometric regressions that have focused on a sub-
sample of high-tech industries have on average obtained a smaller estimated effect of R&D tax 
credits (i.e. a lower additionality ratio, or a higher user cost elasticity). 
This is an interesting result that has not previously been pointed out in the literature. In our MRA 
dataset, most of the micro-econometric studies do not control for sectoral characteristics and do 
not run separate regressions for different groups of industries. Only a limited number of studies 
do this, either by focusing on specific industries, or by running separate regressions for high-tech 
and low-tech industries. Specifically, the studies of Wang and Tsai (1998), Huang (2009) and 
Yang et al. (2012) focus on Taiwanese companies, and find that enterprises in the electronics 
sector are more responsive to fiscal incentives. Paff (2004 and 2005) and Ho (2006) investigate 
the effects of the alternate incremental credit (AIC) in various US States, pointing out remarkable 
differences between two high-tech industries: pharmaceuticals and software. Lee (2011) estimates 
firm-level regressions for six countries (Canada, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China and India), and 
finds among other things that the degree of competition of each industry affects firms’ 
responsiveness to R&D tax credits.7  
                                                             
7 In addition to these studies included in our MRA dataset, notice also that in their seminal paper Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2002) did also obtain user cost elasticities for all manufacturing industries in their sample. Table 3 in their 
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However, although providing some interesting and significant evidence that the effects of R&D 
tax incentives vary across sectors, these few previous studies have mostly treated this as a 
marginal aspect and not investigated at length whether this is a systematic effect, and what sector-
specific factors may explain these patterns. In short, the existing literature contains some clear 
indications of the existence of cross-industry differences, but it has never explicitly investigated 
this point. So, how could these patterns be explained? We point out two possible alternative 
explanations. 
The first and most simple one is that it may be natural to expect that firms in low-tech sectors, 
which have on average a lower R&D intensity than companies in high-tech sectors, may find it 
relatively easier to increase their R&D expenditures in response to a tax credit scheme. Due to 
the lower initial conditions, in fact, even a small R&D increase as a response to fiscal incentives 
will for low-tech firms represent a relatively large additionality effect. By contrast, achieving an 
additionality effect will be more demanding and difficult for enterprises in high-tech sectors, due 
to the already high level of R&D commitment they have.  
However, this argument is not as obvious as it may appear at first. A large literature in innovation 
studies has extensively investigated sectoral patterns of innovation, and shown that companies in 
different branches of the economy follow substantially different innovation modes and strategies 
(Pavitt, 1984; Malerba, 2005). In particular, in several low-tech and traditional industries, R&D is 
not a dominant strategy to develop new technologies, and firms rely instead on other channels 
such as the purchase of new capital machineries, and/or organizational and marketing 
innovations not based on formal R&D activities. The fact that the R&D propensity of firms 
varies substantially across sectors casts some doubts on the first explanation we have pointed out. 
So, a different reason explaining why tax credits have a stronger additionality effect in low-tech 
industries than high-tech sectors may be based on the sectoral patterns of innovation literature, 
and in particular on the concept of technological and economic opportunities (Dosi, 1982). Industrial 
sectors differ in terms of technological opportunities – the ease with which innovative input leads 
to technological output – as well as demand conditions and economic opportunities. Low-tech 
and mature sectors are typically characterized by a lower level of technological and economic 
opportunities and less dynamic demand conditions than high-tech industries (Von Tunzelmann 
and Acha, 2005). It may be argued that firms in low-tech sectors, due to the lower level of market 
opportunities they face, are on average more likely to experience financial constraints and, for 
this reason, they may find it convenient to apply to a tax credits scheme in order to enjoy fiscal 
benefits. According to this second argument, the higher additionality of companies in low-tech 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
article indicates that the estimated user cost elasticities are greater for lower-tech sectors and smaller (or not 
significant) for most high-tech sectors. 
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sectors could be interpreted not as an indication of technological dynamism and catch up, but 
rather as a signal that firms in low-tech and traditional industries are eager to apply to tax credit 
schemes primarily to achieve fiscal benefits and alleviate their financial constraints rather than for 
increasing their R&D investments in a permanent manner. 
These two alternative explanations have not previously been discussed in the literature. It is not 
possible here to conclude which of them is more plausible, and this discussion does indeed call 
for future research. We further discuss this issue and propose further avenue for future research 
in the next section. 
 
< Tables 4 and 5 here > 
 
 
5. A framework for future research 
So, how should future research investigate cross-industry differences in the effects of R&D tax 
incentives? We provide here a simple framework outlining new directions and hypotheses for 
future research. Consider an economy with s sectors. Each industry j has a population of Nj 
(homogenous) firms, out of which nj enterprises receive an R&D tax credit at time t. The 
(average) additionality ratio in this sector can be defined as: 
 
αj = (RDj; t+1 – RDj; t) / RDj; t                                                                                                    (6) 
 
where RDj is the R&D expenditures of each firm in a given period. The total additional R&D 
spending induced by the tax incentive scheme in industry j is then: 
 
ΔRDj = nj (RDj; t+1 – RDj; t)                                                                                                      (7) 
 
This total increment can be rewritten as the product of three factors: 
 
ΔRDj = αj • (nj / Nj) • (Nj • RDj)                                                                                               (8) 
 
The first factor is the (average) additionality ratio defined above. The second is the share of firms 
in the industry that have received R&D support, indicating the sector-specific propensity of firms 
to respond to R&D policy incentives, and/or their ability to apply and receive such fiscal 
benefits. The third factor is the total R&D pool, i.e. the total amount of R&D expenditures 
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carried out by all enterprises in that sector. The literature surveyed in the previous sections has 
typically focused on the first factor only. However, if we want to estimate the overall innovation 
effects of a tax incentive scheme, the second and third factors matter as well. All of the three 
factors pointed out in equation 8 are arguably sector-specific: they can reasonably be expected to 
vary systematically across industries, and it is therefore important to analyze how variations in 
sector-specific characteristics shape the effects of R&D policy on firms’ innovative activities. 
Let us now shift the focus to the economic effects of R&D tax credits. The additional R&D 
carried out in industry j leads, through the creation of new products and processes, to an increase 
in the sector’s TFP level: 
 
ΔTFPj = ΔRDj • γj                                                                                                                     (9) 
 
The parameter γj defines the level of technological opportunities in the sector, which indicates, as 
noted in the previous section, the ease with which innovative inputs are translated into innovative 
output and value added (Dosi, 1982). This is as well-known an industry-specific parameter, which 
varies substantially across sectors (and historical periods), tending to be high in technologically 
advanced and emerging sectors, and low in more traditional and mature industries.  
Besides, the additional R&D carried out in industry j will also lead to economic and productivity 
gains in other industries of the economy through a set of inter-industry knowledge spillover 
effects (Wieser, 2005). These can be defined as: 
 
ΔTFPk = ΔRDj • δj • πj;k                                                                                                          (10) 
 
where k indicates all other sectors of the economy except j (k = 1, …, s; k ≠ j); πj;k measures the 
technological proximity between j and k (i.e. the intensity of the knowledge diffusion from the 
former to the latter sector); and δj represents the knowledge spillover potential embodied in industry j. 
The knowledge spillover potential indicates the extent to which the advanced knowledge 
produced by firms in sector j has the potential to drive the growth of other industries. This is in 
other words a measure of the so-called pervasiveness of the new technologies produced in sector j, 
indicating whether they have widespread impacts throughout the whole economic system or 
rather weak effects on a limited set of related industries. Besides the degree of novelty of the new 
technologies, sectoral pervasiveness also depends on the position of each industry in the 
economic system, and the function it plays: upstream industries producing advanced knowledge 
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are likely to lead to stronger spillover effects in the whole economy than downstream (supplier-
dominated) industries (Pavitt, 1984; Castellacci, 2008). 
In short, while the literature on R&D policy evaluation has so far focused on the estimation of 
the (average) additionality ratio for the whole economy, the framework described here points out 
the need to broaden up the focus of future research towards the joint investigation of three 
related factors: (1) the total incremental effect of the tax credit in a given industry (ΔRDj; equation 8); 
(2) the productivity effects of this in the same industry (ΔTFPj; equation 9); (3) the spillover effects to all 
other industries (ΔTFPk; equation 10). From a policy point of view, the estimation of the average 
additionality ratio on which the literature has so far focused (i.e. the parameter α j above) does not 
provide sufficient information to assess the overall innovation and economic effects of an R&D 
tax incentive scheme. Only the joint consideration of the three dimensions pointed out above can 
enable a complete assessment of the benefits of R&D policy.8 And the key point that we want to 
make here is that all of the three factors are sector-specific, as pointed out in the innovation 
literature, so that it is reasonable to expect the effects of R&D tax incentives to vary 
systematically across industries. 
Specifically, we outline three directions for future research, and for each of these we formulate a 
general hypothesis for future theoretical and empirical studies in this field. The first direction 
refers to the study of the total incremental effect of the tax credit in a given industry. Consider 
equation 8. All of the three terms in this equation are likely to differ substantially across 
industries. The total R&D pool term (Nj • RDj) is supposedly greater for a high-tech industry 
than a low-tech sector. The other two terms – the propensity to apply to the tax credits 
programme (nj / Nj) and the average additionality ratio in the market (αj) – are also sector-
specific. In fact, a large literature on competition and innovation has previously investigated the 
relationship between competiton conditions within each industry and the incentives of firms to 
engage in R&D. This traditional literature has potentially important implications for the study of 
the effectiveness of R&D policy. 
On the one hand, industry-level competition may decrease the monopoly rents of prospective 
innovative firms, thus reducing their incentives to engage in R&D activities. This is an argument 
traditionally known as the Schumpeterian effect, which postulates the existence of a negative 
relationship between the degree of competition in an industry and the R&D intensity of firms 
(Geroski 1990; Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2004; Tang 2006). If this effect holds, then we should 
                                                             
8 The total benefits of an R&D support scheme should then be compared with its costs, including both the costs in 
terms of fiscal resources that are devoted to private companies’ R&D activities and the administrative costs that 
policy-makers incur to set up and manage the scheme (David et al., 2000; Hall and Van Reenen, 2000). 
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arguably expect firms’ propensity to apply to a tax credits programme (n j / Nj) and the average 
additionality ratio (αj) to be lower in a highly competitive industry than in an oligopolistic market. 
On the other hand, more recent research on competition and innovation has also pointed out the 
possibility that product market competition may also turn out to boost R&D investments, since it 
may increase the incremental profits that firms obtain by investing in R&D activities (Aghion et 
al. 1997 and 2005; Castellacci, 2011). This second argument, the escape-competition effect, points out 
that the relationship between the degree of market competition and innovation may hence be 
positive, and even more so in neck-to-neck industries where competiton between rival firms is 
fierce. If this effect prevails, we should instead expect that the propensity to apply to a tax credits 
programme and the additionality ratio is greater in a highly competitive industry than in an 
oligopolistic market.9 In short, it is not possible to determine ex-ante which of these two effects 
prevails, so that future empirical research should examine how the effects of R&D tax credits on 
firms’ innovation are affected by the degree of competition that characterizes each sector. 
The second direction for future research relates to the productivity effects of R&D tax credits within 
a given sector (see equation 9). As pointed out above, the level of technological opportunities in a 
given industry (the parameter γj) is an industry-specific factor that varies substantially across 
sectors (Dosi, 1982; Castellacci and Zheng, 2010). Opportunities are typically high in 
technologically advanced and new emerging sectors, and lower in more traditional and mature 
industries (Von Tunzelmann and Acha, 2005). Hence, it would be reasonable to expect that the 
productivity effects of R&D tax credits within the same industry is positively related to the level 
of technological opportunities that characterize the industry at any given time. 
Finally, the third direction for future research refers to the spillover effects that R&D tax credits in 
sector j have on all other industries k of the economy (equation 10 above). The literature on 
sectoral patterns of innovation has previously pointed out sectoral taxonomies that identify some 
key sector-specific dimensions that characterize the innovative process in each industry and shape 
its technological trajectory and economic performance over time (Malerba, 2005). One important 
result in this literature is that some sectors have a high degree of pervasiveness, and hence a 
strong knowledge spillover potential (the parameter δj in equation 7), thus playing a central role as 
key drivers of the whole economic system. In particular, upstream industries that produce 
advanced technological knowledge are likely to lead to stronger spillover effects throughout the 
whole economy than downstream (supplier-dominated) industries (Pavitt, 1984; Castellacci, 
2008). In terms of the effectiveness of R&D policy, this would imply that the spillover effects 
that R&D tax credits in sector j have on all other industries k of the economy should be expected 
                                                             
9 This hypothesis is also in line with the empirical results of Lee (2011), which finds the degree of market 
competition to be positively related to the average estimated additionality ratio. 
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to be substantially stronger for upstream knowledge intensive industries (e.g. knowledge-based 
services, science-based manufacturing) than for downstream supplier-dominated sectors (e.g. 
personal goods and service providers). 
The three general hypotheses that we have sketched here are not only relevant for future 
academic research in this field, but do also have an important policy dimension. In fact, the 
bottom line of our argument is that the total additional R&D spending induced by a tax incentive 
scheme (∑jΔRDj) should to the extent possible be concentrated in industries with high 
technological opportunities and in sectors that lead to strong spillover effects to the rest of the 
economy. By contrast, if the R&D additionality effect is mainly skewed towards low opportunity 
mature sectors and/or downstream industries with low pervasiveness and spillover potential, the 
overall effect of the R&D tax credit scheme in the national economy will be sub-optimal.  
In this respect, the MRA results presented in the previous section seem to cast some doubts on 
the efficiency of this type of R&D policy. Those results do in fact suggest that the additionality 
effects of fiscal incentives to R&D are on average stronger for low-tech industries than for high-
tech sectors. If this finding will be corroborated by future empirical research, it would imply that 
fiscal resources intended to stimulate R&D and economic competitiveness tend to benefit 
relatively more those branches of the economy that do not have the highest innovative potential 
and economic impact on the growth of the national economy. If so, R&D tax incentives 
mechanisms should be redesigned in order to take into account the sector-specific conditions 
that shape innovation propensity and dynamics in different industries of the economy. 
 
 
6. Conclusions  
The paper has carried out a survey of the micro-econometric literature on the effects of R&D tax 
incentives on firms’ innovation activities. This literature has rapidly expanded in the last few 
years, due to the increasing popularity of fiscal incentives as a policy tool, and also thanks to the 
larger availability of firm-level datasets in several countries in the OECD area. This empirical 
research typically leads to the conclusion that tax credits have a positive effect on corporate R&D 
investments, by increasing the amount of R&D carried out by each company, and by lowering its 
marginal costs. Our survey has in particular focused on one specific aspect that has not received 
sufficient attention in previous research: the sectoral dimension. Out of the large amount of 
micro-econometric studies in this field, only a limited number of them has controlled for cross-
industry differences in the estimated effects of R&D policy, and no previous work has discussed 
a conceptual framework to investigate whether and why this could be the case.  
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To study this unexplored question, we have carried out a meta-regression analysis: this has set up 
and made available a new database collecting a large number of firm-level studies on the effects 
of R&D tax credits, and then investigated the factors that may explain differences in the 
estimated effects that are reported in the literature. The key explanatory factor we have focused 
on is precisely the sectoral dimension: our MRA regressions have investigated whether those 
studies that have controlled for sectoral characteristics, e.g. by comparing high- and low-tech 
industries, have on average achieved different results than all other micro-econometric works. 
The main result of the MRA analysis is indeed that sectors matter. Micro-econometric studies that 
have focused on a sub-sample of high-tech industries have on average obtained a smaller 
estimated effect of R&D tax credits. This is an interesting result that has not previously been 
pointed out in the literature.  
Why may this be the case – why do the effects of R&D tax credits vary across sectors, and what 
are the possible implications for policy? These questions open up a new avenue for theoretical 
and empirical research in this field. The second part of our paper has proposed a simple 
framework to investigate these issues and pointed out some more specific new directions and 
hypotheses for future research. In short, our argument is that the overall benefits of an R&D tax 
incentives scheme depend on the complex interplay of three related factors: (1) the total 
incremental effect of the tax credit in a given industry; (2) the productivity effects of this in the 
same industry; (3) the spillover effects to all other industries. All of the three factors are sector-
specific: firms’ responsiveness to fiscal incentives to R&D and their economic effects are 
arguably closely dependent on sectoral characteristics such as the degree of market competition, 
the level of technological opportunities, and the intensity of knowledge diffusion and inter-
industry spillover effects. Future research should therefore develop a theoretical and empirical 
framework to understand how these sector-specific characteristics shape firms’ responses to 
R&D policy. 
This research task is highly relevant for innovation policy-making. In fact, the bottom line of our 
argument is that the total additional R&D spending induced by a tax incentive scheme should to 
the extent possible be concentrated in industries with high technological opportunities and in 
sectors that lead to strong spillover effects to the rest of the economy. By contrast, if the R&D 
additionality effect is mainly skewed towards low opportunity mature sectors and/or downstream 
industries with low pervasiveness and spillover potential, the overall effect of the R&D tax credit 
scheme in the national economy will be sub-optimal.  
In fact, our main MRA result – that the additionality effects of fiscal incentives to R&D are on 
average stronger for low-tech industries than for high-tech sectors – casts some doubts on the 
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efficiency of this type of R&D policy. If this finding will be corroborated by future empirical 
research, it would imply that fiscal resources intended to stimulate R&D and economic 
competitiveness tend to benefit relatively more those branches of the economy that do not have 
the highest innovative potential and economic impact on the growth of the national economy. If 
so, R&D tax incentives mechanisms should be redesigned in order to take into account the 
sector-specific conditions that shape innovation propensity and dynamics in different industries 
of the economy, e.g. by introducing a sectorally differentiated incentive scheme to give stronger 
support to firms in more innovative and higher-opportunity industries. This policy implication is 
however far from conclusive, and will necessitate a substantial amount of further comparative 
research on different countries and industrial sectors.  
In addition, two more policy-related considerations will have to be undertaken in order to assess 
the efficiency, or possible sub-optimality, of R&D policy. First, countries differ substantially in 
terms of their specialization patterns and industrial structure. Some economies, even in the 
presence of sub-optimal effects of R&D tax incentives, may still decide to invest in technological 
upgrading of domestic mature sectors that may be relevant in terms of employment or other 
policy objectives (e.g. availability of natural resources) – rather than focusing its R&D efforts in 
the promotion of high-tech industries. The economic efficiency of R&D policy should therefore 
be balanced with a set of other policy considerations and objectives.  
Secondly, the evaluation of the effects of fiscal incentives to R&D should to the extent possible 
be carried out jointly with the study of the impacts of R&D subsidies. The latter often have a 
more explicit policy, and hence sectoral, dimension and set of priorities, and this may contribute 
to re-balance, or strengthen, the national pattern of R&D specialization of each economy. The 
literature has so far separately studied the effects of R&D tax credits and R&D subsidies. Future 
research should investigate these jointly, and study how different combinations of them may lead 
to different technological trajectories and economic outcomes. 
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Table 1. List of papers included in the meta-regression database: Positive tax-credit measures (estimates of the additionality ratio) 
 
Art. 
 # 
 
Reference 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Time Period* 
 
 
No. of 
Obs.** 
 
 
No. of 
Firms** 
 
 
No. of  
Estimates 
 
 
Avg. Effect 
Measure 
 
 
Avg. Value 
of t-statisitc 
 
1 Yang et al 2012 Taiwan 2001-2005 2588 . 6 0.1553333 2.21912475 
2 Billings et al 2001 US 1992-1998 1848 231 2 0.19065 1.035 
3 Paff 2005 California, Massachusetts (US) 1994-1999 780 . 6 0.33563 2.34463485 
4 Kasahara et al 2012 Japan 2000-2003 7057 . 48 1.5799792 1.22272662 
5 Yohei 2011 Japan 2006 1452 . 21 1.247429 4.89492298 
6 Huang 2009 Taiwan 2001-2005 3031 . 9 0.812667 3.33444444 
6 Huang 2009 Taiwan 2001-2005 3031 . 3 0.142 2.69785237 
7 Lee 2011 
Japan, Canada, Korea, Taiwan, 
China, India 
1997 815 
. 
13 0.176923 1.53461538 
8 Klassen et al 2004 US, Canada 1991-1997 821 168 10 1.9092 3.164 
9 Wang and Tsai 1998 Taiwan 1997 . 124 2 -12.785 -3.23 
10 Billings and Fried 1999 US 1994 . 113 1 0.018 2.25 
11 Duguet 2010 France 1993-2003 . 1645 30 0.075233 3.49466667 
11 Duguet 2010 France 1993-2003 . 1645 40 0.0333 1.2785 
12 Mercer-Blackman 2008 Colombia 2000-2002 2278 . 3 1.066667 2.18333333 
13 Berger 1993 US 1975-1989 3551 231 2 0.00065 3.397 
14 Swenson 1992 US 1975-1988 5006 . 6 0.03 -0.87833333 
15 Ho 2006 US 1975-1999 36977 . 72 3.723458 1.0670643 
16 
 
Hægeland and Møen 2007 
 
Norway 
 
1993-2005 
 
8233 
 
. 3 
 
0.496 
 
2.74173385 
 
 
Notes: *This is the longest time period for which data is available. Some of the estimates in these studies have however been obtained on different sub-periods. **This is the overall 
number of observations/firms available for each study. Some of the estimates in these studies have however been obtained on smaller sub-samples of observations. 
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Table 2. List of papers included in the meta-regression database: Negative tax-credit measures (estimates of the user-cost elasticity) 
 
Art. 
 # 
 
Reference 
 
Country 
 
Time Period* 
 
No. of 
Obs.** 
 
No. of 
Firms** 
 
No. of  
Estimates 
 
Avg. Effect 
Measure 
 
Avg. Value 
of t-statistic 
 
1 
 
Harris et al 2009 
 
Northern Ireland 
 
1998-2003 
 
2063 
 
563 
 
2 
 
-0.9465 
 
-4.645 
2 Lokshin and Mohnen 2012 Netherlands  1996-2004 1185 . 6 -0.503333 -3.11137566 
3 Baghana and Mohnen 2009 Canada 1997-2003 1386 . 8 -0.0995 -1.84950352 
4 Koga 2003 Japan 1991-1998 6098 904 6 -0.397617 -1.55593022 
5 Billings et al 2001 US 1992-1998 1848 231 2 -1.74105 -2.783 
6 Paff 2005 California, Massachusetts (US) 1994-1999 780 . 10 -7.37436 -0.54915181 
7 Paff 2004 California (US) 1997-1999 249 83 3 21.212233 0.80784899 
8 Rao 2010 US 1981-1991 7762 168 11 -0.479818 -7.36414319 
9 Hines 1993 US 1984-1989 . 116 8 -1.127038 -2.71886941 
10 Daegenais e al 1997 Canada 1975-1992 4859 434 1 -0.0686 -1.632 
11 Corchuelo and Martinez-Ros 2009 Spain 1990-2002 898 . 6 -0.465 -1.5833333 
11 Corchuelo and Martinez-Ros 2009 Spain 1990-2002 898 . 18 0.658889 1.85555556 
12 Hall 1993 US 1980-1991 4360 . 8 -0.48625 -5.73549559 
12 Hall 1993 US 1980-1991 4360 . 5 -1.674 -9.4101444 
13 Mulkay and Mairesse 2008 France 1983-2002 15977 2431 4 -1.6255 -10.0568749 
14 Mulkay and Mairesse 2003 France 1982-1996 6021 765 4 -0.72975 -4.26521144 
15 Lokshin and Mohnen 2007 Netherlands 1996-2004 2615 841 10 -0.5517 -2.74173385 
16 Parisi and Sembenelli 2003 Italy 1992-1997 4356 . 3 -4.36 -4.16269748 
17 
 
Poot et al 2003 
 
Netherlands 
 
1997-1998 
 
. 
 
1751 1 
 
-0.11 
 
-4.5 
 
 
Notes: *This is the longest time period for which data is available. Some of the estimates in these studies have however been obta ined on different sub-periods. **This is the overall 
number of observations/firms available for each study. Some of the estimates in these studies have however been obtained on smaller sub-samples of observations. 
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Table 3. Definition of indicators and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Original Transformed* 
  Mean SE Mean SE 
INVSE 
The inverse of the standard error (SE) of the effect 
estimate. 
1.3471 4.8797 40.1641 377.3092 
HTECH 
Dummy: 1 if sub-sample is high-tech firms, 0 
otherwise. 
0.1399 0.3474 1.1125 5.9341 
MANUF 
Dummy: 1 if sub-sample is manufacturing firms, 0 
otherwise. 
0.0102 0.1005 0.0647 0.6814 
SME 
Dummy: 1 if sub sample is small or medium sized 
firms (SMEs), 0 otherwise. 
0.1730 0.3788 0.8361 3.5357 
RDt-1 
Dummy: 1 if lagged R&D is included as control in 
the econometric specification, 0 if not included. 
0.2952 0.4567 30.5213 377.7413 
COUNTRY 
Dummy: 1 if country fixed-effects or country 
interaction-effects are included as controls in the 
econometric specification, 0 if not included. 
0.1425 0.3500 0.5956 1.8267 
SUBSIDY 
 
Dummy: 1 if public R&D subsidies received by firms 
are included as control in the econometric 
specification, 0 if not included. 
 
0.2977 
 
0.4578 
 
4.1583 
 
11.3895 
 
 
Note: *These are transformed according to equation (4) i.e. divided by the effect estimates’ standard errors. 
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Table 4. MRA results: Positive tax-credit measures. Dependent variable: TSTAT (t-statistic of the estimated additionality ratio) 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Robust SE Cluster SE Robust SE Cluster SE Robust SE Cluster SE Robust SE Cluster SE 
CONSTANT 
1.891494 
(15.29)*** 
1.891494 
(4.88)*** 
1.899479 
(15.11)*** 
1.899479 
(5.51)*** 
1.916535 
(14.79)*** 
1.916535 
(5.50)*** 
1.444614 
(9.35)*** 
1.444614 
(5.87)*** 
INVSE 
0.0003052 
(3.08)*** 
0.0003052 
(3.23)*** 
.0003106 
(3.07)*** 
0.0003106 
(3.45)*** 
0.0003071 
(3.03)*** 
0.0003071 
(3.38)*** 
0.0316881 
(3.97)*** 
0.0316881 
(2.89)** 
HTECH 
 
 
 
-0.0340836 
(-3.01)*** 
-0.0340836 
(-2.67)** 
-0.0312554 
(-2.74)*** 
-0.0312554 
(-2.50)** 
-0.0210417 
(-1.76)* 
-0.0210417 
(-1.72) 
MANUF 
 
 
 
0.8297275 
(11.65)*** 
0.8297275 
(12.32)*** 
0.8263947 
(11.51)*** 
0.8263947 
(12.14)*** 
0.6178825 
(6.75)*** 
0.6178825 
(2.93)** 
SME 
 
 
   
-0.0218241 
(-1.40) 
-0.0218241 
(-1.58) 
-0.0036951 
(-0.22) 
-0.0036951 
(-0.27) 
RDt-1 
 
 
     
-0.0313152 
(-3.93)*** 
-0.0313152 
(-2.85)** 
COUNTRY 
 
 
     
0.2694418 
(3.82)*** 
0.2694418 
(1.31) 
SUBSIDY 
 
 
     
-0.0264371 
(-1.76)* 
-0.0264371 
(-1.28) 
         
R-squared 
 
0.0045 
 
0.0045 
 
0.0654 
 
0.0654 
 
0.0670 
 
0.0670 
 
0.2050 
 
0.2050 
 
Observations 
 
277 
 
277 
 
277 
 
277 
 
277 
 
277 
 
277 
 
277 
 
 
Notes: Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. t-statistic in parentheses. 
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Table 5 MRA results: Negative tax-credit measures. Dependent variable: TSTAT (t-statistic of the estimated user-cost elasticity) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Robust SE Cluster SE Robust SE Cluster SE Robust SE Cluster SE Robust SE Cluster SE 
CONSTANT 
-1.559303 
(-4.63)*** 
-1.559303 
(-1.60) 
-1.59566 
(-4.63)*** 
-1.59566 
(-1.57) 
-1.667683 
(-4.76)*** 
-1.667683 
(-1.65) 
-2.093408 
(-4.77)*** 
-2.093408 
(-3.45)*** 
INVSE 
-0.1455175 
(-5.27)*** 
-0.1455175 
(-3.43)*** 
-0.1427606 
(-5.22)*** 
-0.1427606 
(-3.35)*** 
-0.1439019 
(-5.12)*** 
-0.1439019 
(-3.41)*** 
-0.2342409 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.2342409 
(-3.35)*** 
HTECH 
 
 
 
4.465753 
(5.37)*** 
4.465753 
(2.34)** 
4.601495 
(5.37) 
4.601495 
(2.42)** 
6.679015 
(5.51)*** 
6.679015 
(4.65)*** 
MANUF 
 
 
 
-0.5464603 
(-16.67)*** 
-0.5464603 
(-6.06)*** 
-.5383328 
(-15.78)*** 
-0.5383328 
(-5.92)*** 
-0.5316152 
(-11.74)*** 
-0.5316152 
(-7.77)*** 
SME 
 
 
   
0.1538882 
(2.23)** 
0.1538882 
(1.37) 
0.0779268 
(1.87)* 
0.0779268 
(1.34) 
RDt-1 
 
 
     
0.1249167 
(1.86)* 
0.1249167 
(1.74) 
COUNTRY 
 
 
     
-1.1981 
(-1.20) 
-1.1981 
(-1.06) 
SUBSIDY 
 
 
     
1.128952 
(5.74)*** 
1.128952 
(6.89)*** 
         
R-squared 
 
0.2716 
 
0.2716 
 
0.2973 
 
0.2973 
 
0.3062 
 
0.3062 
 
0.4797 
 
0.4797 
 
Observations 
 
116 
 
116 
 
116 
 
116 
 
116 
 
116 
 
116 
 
116 
 
 
Notes: Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. t-statistic in parentheses. 
